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Phyllis van slyck
isabel archer’s “Delicious Pain”: 
charting lacanian Desire in  
The Portrait of a Lady
That’s what love is. It’s one’s own ego that one loves in 
love, one’s own ego made real on the imaginary level.
—Jacques Lacan, Freud’s Papers on Technique
I cannot escape my fate . . . I can’t escape unhappiness . . . 
—Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady
i
In an early chapter of The Portrait of a Lady, Henry James’s 
narrator, in an effort to illuminate the reader about Isabel Ar-
cher’s character, offers a gentle but somewhat ominous warning: 
“Sometimes she went so far as to wish that she might find herself 
some day in a difficult position, so that she should have the 
pleasure of being as heroic as the occasion demanded” (James, 
1995, p. 54).1 By the end of the novel it seems that James’s 
heroine has been granted her wish: Isabel finds herself impris-
oned in a “house of suffocation” where there is “neither light 
nor air” (p. 360). Yet Isabel’s motive for returning to Gilbert 
Osmond, despite her knowledge of his betrayal, begs for an 
explanation that neither Isabel nor James offers us. Jonathan 
Freedman has called the ending of The Portrait “an interpre-
tive mystery . . . one of the most famous cruxes in American 
literature” (1994, p. 78), and, more recently, J. Hillis Miller has 
argued that “the basis of decision is hidden,” that we cannot 
determine Isabel’s motive (2005, p. 16).2 James himself made 
the following observation about the ending of The Portrait:
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The obvious criticism of course will be that it is not fin-
ished—that I have not seen the heroine to the end of 
her situation—that I have left her en l’air.—This is both 
true and false. The whole of anything is never told; you 
can only take what groups together. What I have done has 
that unity— it groups together. It is complete in itself—
and the rest may be taken up or not, later. (1947, p. 18)3 
Despite the coherence James claims for his earliest mas-
terpiece, with regard to Isabel’s final decision and “the end of 
her situation,” he does leave us, as he puts it, en l’air, so perhaps 
it is time to step back from the question of why Isabel returns 
to Osmond in order to pose a broader one. What exactly does 
James’s heroine want? Or, as Renata Salecl asks in her discus-
sion of “Love Between Desire and Drive,” “What is the nature of 
desire in a love relationship . . . what makes the loving subject 
see the other as the object of love?” (1998, p. 46). Before we 
can consider these pivotal questions that define the central 
action of The Portrait of a Lady, let us review James’s reflections 
on Isabel Archer in his 1908 preface to the New York Edition. 
Observing that “millions of presumptuous girls, intelligent or 
not intelligent, daily affront their destiny,” he asks “what is it 
open to their destiny to be, at the most, that we should make 
an ado about it?” (1995, p. 9). James argues that the writer 
must find the most appropriate “difficulty” for his heroine and 
the “most beautiful incentive,” and notes, tellingly, that this 
difficulty or incentive must be found “in the young woman’s 
own consciousness” (pp. 10–11). Unlike Catherine Sloper of 
Washington Square, who presumes almost nothing, who lacks 
the capacity to engage us with her intelligence, and whose 
strength lies solely in her consistency and stubbornness—all 
possible reasons for James’s dismissal of that text as unworthy 
of inclusion in the New York Edition—Isabel Archer engages 
us because she pursues her destiny with idealism and integrity, 
and it is precisely her best qualities—her intelligence, her 
generosity, her passion, and especially her innocent belief in 
her right and capacity to compose an independent self—that 
lead her to her fate. 
James also observes in his preface that, for each of his 
characters, he seeks “the complications they would be most 
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likely to produce and to feel” (p. 5, emphasis added). How 
might we understand the situation in which Isabel finds herself, 
given the extent to which she helps to “produce” the kind of 
“complications” that reverse and even destroy her most ideal-
istic, and seemingly positive, intentions? I would like to offer 
a reading of Isabel’s choices, a perverse reading, if you will, 
but one which matches James’s heroine’s own perversion, her 
consistent turning away from, even against, the very postulates 
she claims to live by. Isabel’s discovery of love through the ideal 
image of herself she finds mirrored in Gilbert Osmond’s gaze 
leads to a reversal of her most noble impulses. Her choice of a 
suitor also points to something that would seem the opposite of 
desire, but which is, in fact, its foundation. In choosing Gilbert 
Osmond, Isabel seeks to experience, however unconsciously, 
what Jacques Lacan defines as jouissance, or “painful pleasure” 
(1986/1992, p. 185).4 This is the pleasure that arises when the 
individual goes beyond what is bearable, testing the limits of 
desire, seeking an object, and a self, that can never be found.5 
Although she insists on her ability to achieve psychological and 
social freedom, to stand apart from what James refers to as her 
“envelope of circumstances” (1995, p. 175), Isabel’s behavior 
suggests that she is drawn, instead, to those situations that will 
test the boundaries of that “self” and reveal its impossibility. 
Isabel thus fulfills James’s effort to transform “the mere slim 
shade of an intelligent but presumptuous girl, to [endow her] 
with the high attributes of a Subject,” but not exactly in the 
way James may have intended (pp. 8–9). 
In her quest for completion, for that object which will per-
fectly reflect her ideal self, and in her choice of an “other” who 
mirrors this ideal—but also, significantly, its dark interior, the 
void at the center of identity—Isabel confronts her own alien-
ated, ambiguous and in-coherent self, what Jacques Lacan calls 
the split subject (1977, p. 128).6 Isabel’s choices throughout the 
novel reveal her unconscious fascination with what lies beyond 
the pleasure principle, and she tacitly embraces the death drive 
as she confronts the irrevocable “lack” which constitutes the 
human condition (Lacan, 1981, p. 214).7 Her final decision, 
however, also offers her an ontological escape from Osmond’s 
(and perhaps James’s own) formalist control of her identity. 
Choosing to remain with someone who will render her desire 
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impossible forces Isabel to experience the paradoxical “split-
ting” that exposes her shattered subjectivity. Her active role 
in the destruction of her ideal of coherence and autonomy, 
including her final decision to return to Osmond rather than 
“to save what [she] can of her life” (p. 633), defines her, avant 
la lettre, as a post-humanist subject.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud argues that in the 
end what we seek is not pleasure but the pain that connects 
us with our unacknowledged but inevitable tendency towards 
dissolution: “If we may assume as an experience admitting of no 
exception that everything living dies from causes within itself, 
and returns to the inorganic, we can only say ‘The goal of all 
life is death’” (1920, p. 38). Shifting the interpretation of the 
death drive from the biological to the ontological realm, Lacan 
argues that the individual struggles not to return to a state of 
equilibrium (as Freud suggests) but, rather, the opposite: to 
maintain a state of permanent longing for an impossible object 
of desire. In support of his position, Lacan claims that Freud, 
too, recognizes the way desire is sustained by impossibility: 
“Freud strongly indicates that what in the end gives the . . . 
apparatus of the ego its real support, its consistency, is that it 
is sustained within by this lost object.” Because love actually de-
velops, and is supported, through this longing, Lacan explains, 
“jouissance is introduced into the dimension of the subject’s 
being” (2007, p. 50). Put simply, “the death drive is the name 
given to that constant desire in the subject to break through 
the pleasure principle towards the Thing; it is that which the 
subject can never assume, integrate, subjectivize” (Evans, 1996, 
p. 92). Lacan’s reworking of the Freudian death drive as a quest 
for the lost object that can never be found offers insight into 
the true nature of Isabel’s desire.
Early clues to the ambiguous nature of Isabel’s quest are 
suggested once again by James’s narrator, who reminds the 
reader just how contradictory her ideas about her emerging 
identity are. She insists on her independence from social 
constraints; she longs “to move in a realm of light, of natu-
ral wisdom” (p. 56), yet she cares deeply about what others 
think of her. Her belief that “her life should always be in har-
mony with the most pleasing impression she should produce” 
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(p. 54), anticipating William James’s “ideal social self 
. . . a self that is at least worthy of approving recognition by the 
highest possible judging companion” (James, 1890, p. 315), is 
at odds with Isabel’s determination not to be bound by social 
codes: “‘Nothing that belongs to me is any measure of me; 
everything’s on the contrary a limit, a barrier, and a perfectly 
arbitrary one’” (p. 175). James’s heroine’s insistence on her 
autonomy—to her Aunt Lydia, to her cousin, Ralph, and to her 
deceptive mentor, Serena Merle—and her desire to be free of 
others’ control, is undermined, long before Gilbert Osmond 
appears on the scene, by a conflict between her private ideal 
of selfhood and her desire to be pleasing to the eye of an un-
named but definitive other. Despite her alleged program of 
Emersonian self-realization, Isabel seeks acceptance by those 
who reflect back to her an ideal self-image she has already 
(though only vaguely) imagined.
For Lacan, the quest for an ideal self is precisely what sets 
desire in motion, but the impossible desire we define as love 
strikes us only when “the object coincides with [the] hero’s 
fundamental [self] image” (1998, p. 142). The other must 
mirror back to the subject a fulfilling portrait that she has 
already, in a sense, composed: “The subject sees his being in a 
reflection in relation to the other, that is to say in relation to 
the ich-ideal” (1988, p. 125). Borrowing two terms from Freud, 
the “ideal ego” and the “ego ideal,” Lacan explains that the 
positioning of the self in relation to desire is directly related 
to the formation of subjectivity. The ideal ego is an imaginary 
projection that creates the illusion of unity, the illusion of a 
self (precisely the illusion Isabel is at pains to defend): “The 
human being only sees his form materialized, whole, the mirage 
of himself, outside of himself” (1998, p. 140). The ego ideal, 
in turn, is “the place in the symbolic order from which the 
subject observes himself or herself in the way he or she would 
like to be seen” (Salecl, 1998, p. 11).8
Henry James’s pervasive use of portraiture in this novel, 
beginning with Isabel’s self-idealization and including her 
portraits of her antagonists, may be related to the Lacanian 
notion of the ego ideal, for James’s fascination with the distill-
ing, dramatizing, but also dangerous function of such compos-
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ing reveals the way framing a subject traps the viewer. In this 
context, James’s methodology anticipates Lacan’s ideas about 
the function of the gaze and the mirror stage: the perceiver’s 
composed object, of self or other, fills his or her consciousness 
with an illusion, a misrecognition (Lacan, 1977, p. 6). The key 
to the connection between Lacan’s description of the ego ideal 
and Isabel’s quest is the alienation that the fantasy produces: 
this imaginary space is “where the alienated relation of self 
to its own image is created and maintained” (Klages, 2006, p. 
80). What Isabel creates, or attempts to create, in her own self-
idealization and her idealization of Osmond, is an illusion of a 
self, as well as an illusion of mastery. Predictably, in the course 
of her journey, Isabel discovers a profound gap between her 
desire and its realization.
Despite her repeated professions of independence to her 
aunt Touchett, her cousin Ralph, and to Madame Merle, Isa-
bel’s thinking quickly reveals a paradox: the extent to which 
the controlling fantasy of an ideal self or “ego ideal” dominates 
her effort to follow her desire and secure a love object. In his 
discussion of love, transference, and desire at the end of Four 
Fundamental Concepts, Lacan tells a brief story that perfectly 
captures James’s heroine’s stance in relation to love early in 
the novel:
Not long ago a little girl said to me sweetly that it was 
about time somebody began to look after her so that she 
might seem lovable to herself. In saying this, she provided 
the innocent admission of the mainspring that comes into 
play in the first stage of the transference. The subject 
has a relation with his analyst the centre of which is . . . 
the privileged signifier known as the ego ideal, in so far 
as from there he will feel himself both satisfactory and 
loved. (1981, p. 257)
Like the “little girl” of Lacan’s story, Isabel is seeking some-
one who will make her feel “both satisfactory and loved.” While 
her early suitors, Goodwood and Warburton, may seem to offer 
this kind of love, it is Gilbert Osmond who provides the neces-
sary transference. Isabel immediately recognizes in her suitor 
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the narcissistic image that forms the substance of her ideal self. 
Osmond seems to exhibit the exact qualities that define her 
own aesthetic quest. He tells her that “one ought to make one’s 
life a work of art” (p. 237), effectively mirroring, to Isabel, her 
own early desire to be “one of the best . . . [to] be conscious of 
a fine organization” (pp. 53–54). James’s heroine finds herself 
deeply attracted to the controlled and refined aesthetic image 
Osmond presents to her because she tacitly recognizes her own 
ego ideal in his (calculated) self-representation. She responds 
to Osmond, in other words, as the object that sets desire in 
motion, what Lacan calls the objet petit a (1998, p. 77).9 As Salecl 
explains, we love this object “because of the perfection that 
we have striven to reach for our own ego” (1996, p. 187). Yet 
what is important here is that Isabel’s concept of herself now 
depends on “her misidentification with the image of another” 
(Klages, 2006, p. 81).
Another important reason that Osmond performs this 
function, when Isabel’s other suitors do not, is that Goodwood 
and Warburton literally overwhelm Isabel with the presence of 
their desire; Osmond offers, precisely, its absence. It is absence, 
emptiness, lack, therefore, that defines the real nature of Isabel’s 
desire: she seeks the object that can never be attained—some-
thing that will postpone, rather than grant, her satisfaction. 
For Lacan, this deferral, or failure, is precisely what defines 
the love relationship: “love . . . is in fact that which constitutes 
a remainder in desire, namely, its cause, and sustains desire 
through its lack of satisfaction (insatisfaction) and even its 
impossibility” (1998, p. 6).10
Throughout the early chapters of the novel, Isabel re-
peatedly articulates a consistent interest in the kind of painful 
pleasure described by Lacan: she seeks a kind of knowledge 
that can be found only in situations that she herself defines as 
unhappy. Of the space Isabel occupies in her Albany home, 
the narrator comments, “she might have had the whole house 
to choose from, and the room she had selected was the most 
depressed of its scenes” (p. 33). When she tells her Aunt Lydia 
of her feelings about her family home (“‘A great many people 
have died here; the place has been full of life’”), Mrs. Touchett 
responds with a Sophoclean irony that foreshadows Isabel’s fate: 
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“‘You should go to Florence if you like houses in which things 
have happened—especially deaths’” (pp. 35–36).
Yet Isabel ignores her aunt’s warning and persists in select-
ing “places where the vague lamplight expired,” insisting that 
she must confront “the unpleasant” which has “been too absent 
from her knowledge” (p. 39). She responds to Gardencourt’s 
“well ordered privacy . . . where the tread was muffled by the 
earth itself, and . . . all friction dropped out of contact and all 
shrillness out of talk” in a way that anticipates the subtle control 
that will soon attract her to Osmond (p. 57). It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that Isabel’s initial appreciation of Osmond’s 
Florentine villa, with its carefully manicured garden, is consis-
tent with her earlier sympathy for other subdued environments 
and her strong preference for a controlled aesthetic frame, 
hinting at a fear of real intimacy, or perhaps a tacit awareness 
of its impossibility.11
Osmond, predictably, is the first to understand Isabel’s 
desire: he recognizes her quest for an ego ideal and mirrors 
back to her exactly what she imagines for herself. Setting forth 
an appreciative portrait over an intimate connection, he tells 
Isabel, “For me you’ll always be the most important woman in 
the world.” Isabel, in turn, sees herself reflected in his mind: 
she “looked at herself in this character, looked intently, thinking 
she filled it with a certain grace.” The satisfaction she experi-
ences through Osmond’s mirroring of her ideal self—his words 
“gratify her desire to think well of herself”—further clarifies her 
attraction to someone who, in the narrator’s and reader’s eye, 
is clearly her least appealing suitor (p. 264). Osmond grasps 
the narcissistic nature of Isabel’s self-image and builds upon it, 
while she in turn works, at least initially, to become the image 
that Osmond has composed for her.
In this circular exchange, Osmond teaches Isabel about 
the structure of desire—showing her that while on one level 
it is our private fantasy, that fantasy is stimulated, brought into 
being, through an intimate connection between something we 
have already imagined for ourselves and something which is 
recognized and offered to us by another. This connection, a 
kind of symbolic exchange, “unleashes [a] fatal attachment,” 
and according to Lacan, “that’s what love is. It’s one’s own ego 
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that one loves in love, one’s own ego made real on the imagi-
nary level” (1988, p. 142). We see the “unleashing” of Isabel’s 
“fatal attachment” in her silent, appreciative composition of 
her suitor, framed by his villa and the Florentine hills, when 
she visits him for the first time. It is a gentle yet ominous im-
age, one in which, as James’s narrator tellingly observes, her 
“imagination supplied the human element which she was sure 
had not been wanting”:
She had carried away an image from her visit to his hilltop 
which her subsequent knowledge of him did nothing to 
efface and which put on for her a particular harmony 
with other supposed and divine things, histories within 
histories: the image of a quiet, clever, sensitive, distin-
guished man, strolling on a moss-grown terrace above 
the sweet Val d’Arno . . . The picture had no flourishes, 
but she liked its lowness of tone and the atmosphere of 
summer twilight that pervaded it. It spoke of the kind 
of personal issue that touched her most nearly . . . of 
a lonely studious life in a lovely land; of an old sorrow 
that sometimes ached today; of a feeling of pride that 
. . . had an element of nobleness . . .  (p. 237)
This somber mood of a “lonely studious life” that already 
contains “an old sorrow” clashes eerily with the vibrant energy 
Isabel has brought to earlier conceptions of her identity. Her 
attraction to this subdued, controlled atmosphere can only 
be understood in relation to loss. This “picture” of Osmond 
as “quiet, clever, sensitive,” someone whose “lowness of tone” 
fills her with purpose, confirms the way Isabel will constitute 
and sustain her desire, not through an expansive freedom but 
through what she construes as a “noble” personal restraint. 
Because she admires his “cultivated” “care for beauty and per-
fection,” she projects into his character “a feeling of pride” that 
she believes she can share, for it has “an element of nobleness.” 
But if Isabel imagines a future stretched before them “in the 
disposed vistas . . . of a formal Italian garden,” the picture’s 
“atmosphere of summer twilight” offers a hint that she has also 
glimpsed the serpent (p. 237). Between the controlled boundary 
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of the garden and the fading light, the shadow of repression, 
not freedom, asserts itself. Even Osmond’s domicile, the Palazzo 
Roccanera’s “incommunicative character,” with its “heavy lids, 
but no eyes,” its face that offers a “mask,” ominously announces 
the negative space awaiting James’s heroine (p. 195). It is sig-
nificant that Isabel identifies these qualities before stepping 
over the threshold and marrying Osmond.
The independent ideal Isabel claims for herself in the 
novel’s opening is connected in an almost fatal way to what 
would seem to be its opposite: the desire of another, and 
through that other, desire’s inherent impossibility. Osmond’s 
function as an impossible object of desire, Lacan’s objet petit a, 
emerges through Isabel’s observation of his rigid, aesthetically 
shaped environment, a metonymy for his own deeply control-
ling nature.12 Information warning Isabel against Osmond 
forms the basis of her attraction, betraying her implicit quest 
for jouissance.
In order to meet Osmond’s desire, to become loveable 
to him, Isabel must sacrifice the surface ideal of independent 
self-realization she presents to her aunt Touchett, to her cousin 
Ralph, and even to Serena Merle, and she seems eager to make 
this sacrifice. Almost immediately after meeting Osmond, Isabel 
abandons her dream of an independent life, letting him know 
just how unimportant her autonomy really is to her: “I’m rather 
ashamed of my plans; I make a new one every day” (p. 227). 
Instead, she begins to reshape her desire to match what she 
perceives Osmond wants her to be. All too quickly, Isabel adopts 
Pansy’s “sympathetic docility” (p. 237) and waits, “with a certain 
unuttered contentedness, to have her movements directed” 
(p. 223). Under the spell of Osmond’s claim that one should 
make one’s life a work of art, Isabel anticipates, and begins to 
practice, the suppression of movement and energy her suitor 
will demand. As she sits in the Gallery of the Roman Capitol, 
resting her eyes on the “beautiful blank faces” of the antique 
marbles, “listening . . . to their eternal silence,” she aligns 
her subjectivity with their “deep stillness” (pp. 257–258). The 
Greek sculptures offer a peaceful living death that matches an 
unacknowledged desire for cessation: “their noble quietude . . 
. as with a high door closed for the ceremony, slowly drops on 
the spirit the large white mantle of peace” (p. 257).
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As Isabel studies her suitor, it becomes increasingly evident 
that his psychological unavailability—the way he will invoke 
loss—is the real basis of his appeal. She notes, for example, 
that Osmond generates an anxiety, and even a paralysis, in her: 
“His utterance was the vibration of glass, and if she had put 
out her finger she might have changed the pitch and spoiled 
the concert” (p. 213). Examining his “overdrawn, retouched” 
features, Isabel sees that he is “fastidious,” “critical,” “probably 
irritable” (p. 224). What attracts her is not his largeness of vi-
sion, his freedom or spontaneity, but rather his many signs of 
“strong conviction” (p. 237). Consider, for example, Isabel’s 
assessment of the way Osmond’s views are unlikely to change: 
“He uttered his ideas as if . . . he were used to them and had 
lived with them; old polished knobs and heads and handles 
. . . that could be fitted if necessary to new walking sticks . . .” 
(p. 238). Her own ideas are certainly about to be re-fitted to 
those of Osmond, and it is important to note that her suitor’s 
coldness and control do not emerge for Isabel. These qualities 
are present in her earliest assessments. Osmond’s character 
conforms not only to an aesthetic she naively cherishes but 
also to a more complicated ontological need to confront the 
limit of her desire, to experience jouissance.13
A nostalgia for what is already lost, disguised as aesthetic 
idealism, informs Isabel’s responses as she continues to compose 
herself so as to match her suitor’s vision of life as a work of art. 
Just before Osmond proposes, Isabel contemplates the fact that 
she is leaving Rome, and the thought makes her feel “a pang” 
that “touched the source of tears” (p. 262). In the original 1881 
edition of The Portrait, James’s narrator is more explicit: Isabel’s 
heart throbs with a kind of “delicious pain” (James, 1997, p. 
334). When Osmond confesses he is in love with her, Isabel 
again feels a pang, but one that “suggest[s] . . . the slipping of 
a fine bolt—backward, forward, she couldn’t have said which.” 
Though he stands there “beautiful and generous” in her eyes, 
he is invested “with the golden air of early autumn” (p. 263). 
Isabel has already identified the consistent darkening of the 
atmosphere that Osmond engenders and the prison-like space 
she is about to enter: “there was a last vague space it couldn’t 
cross—a dusky, uncertain tract which looked ambiguous and 
even slightly treacherous, like a moorland seen in the winter 
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twilight. But she was to cross it yet” (p. 265). “Summer twilight” 
has become “winter twilight” even before the marriage takes 
place, and Isabel acknowledges that she is moving into a world 
whose dimensions are “uncertain,” even “treacherous.” But she 
continues to embrace the absence that is Osmond because, as 
Lacan would say, “what she has already affirmed herself to be 
takes on an outward form” (1986/1992, p. 280).
Her suitor perfectly embodies the ontological emptiness 
at the heart of her desire. Osmond’s aesthetic, material, and 
sensual values are strangely conflated (“The finest—in the sense 
of being the subtlest—manly organism she had ever known 
had become her property . . .” [p. 358]), but possession, for 
Isabel, is not an act that enables intimacy but, rather, one that 
enforces aesthetic distance. As William Veeder has suggested, 
“Osmond is for Isabel the quintessence of absence, the essential 
nullity” (1990, p. 111). The absence that occupies the center 
of desire and the way the object of desire is connected to the 
Freudian death drive is insightfully described by Slavoj Žižek: 
“The object is attainable only by way of an incessant postpone-
ment . . . It is here that sublimation sets in—the sublimation 
in the Lacanian sense of the elevation of an object into the 
dignity of the Thing” (1994, p. 96). Osmond has been elevated 
to the “dignity of the Thing”; that is, he becomes “the black 
hole around which desire is organized” (p. 96).14 Isabel’s choice 
is an inevitable step in her movement towards the death drive. 
It is a choice that will lead her to a confrontation with her 
permanently incomplete and divided self. 
ii
A number of philosophical readings of The Portrait in the 
last two decades suggest that, for James, an essentialist notion 
of the self, of its coherence, was both problematic and fascinat-
ing. Such readings lay the foundation for my argument here 
that James is implicitly critiquing the traditional humanist 
notion of a coherent self and anticipating, in his portrait of 
Isabel, a post-structuralist definition of the shattered subject. 
Dana Ringuette argues that James’s “subject is dispersed within 
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a matrix of relations without the comforting backdrop of a 
conventional autonomous Cartesian ‘self’” (1990, p. 120), and 
Priscilla Walton suggests that James’s characters demonstrate 
what Althusser calls the “ambiguity of the subject” (1992, p. 
96). Julie Rivkin traces James’s characters’ “discovery that be-
hind representation there is no firm ground, no singular, easily 
communicable and knowable presence of truth” (1996, p. 80), 
and John Carlos Rowe observes that “the fractured, alienated 
self may well be James’s topic in most of his novels and tales” 
(1998, p. 14).
Readings that contest the coherence of the subject in James 
are supported, from another angle, by psychoanalytic critics who 
confirm the way Isabel’s quest for self-realization is consistently 
undermined by her deliberate submission to Osmond’s will 
and thus to self-negation. For Alfred Habegger, Isabel submits 
to a “dominating master” believing that, in this way, she can 
replace a “lost father” (1990, p. 53). Beth Sharon Ash argues 
that “Isabel’s desire to establish a potentially autonomous 
ego becomes an urgent, though unknowing, response to the 
absent mother” and that Osmond is the “maternal husband” 
who “becomes the bad mother all over again” (1990, p. 144). 
But such readings rely upon evidence that lies outside James’s 
text, and neither these nor the philosophical studies of James’s 
characters’ subjectivity referenced above examine the connec-
tion to desire and to jouissance undertaken here.
Ann-Marie Priest takes the self-annihilation theme implicit 
in a discussion of the death drive in a direction somewhat rel-
evant to this reading, claiming that several of James’s heroines, 
including Isabel, enact a “secularized version of the medieval 
mystical narrative of abjection and transformation.” She argues 
that through the “breaking and bruising” of the self, James’s 
characters experience something akin to the mystic’s “exqui-
site agony of self-emptying” (2001, pp. 164, 177). But Isabel 
confronts something beyond, and quite contrary to, a fulfill-
ing abjection—and mystical transformation of her character 
is not evident. Instead, anticipating the insight of protagonists 
in James’s late works such as John Marcher of The Beast in the 
Jungle and Maggie Verver of The Golden Bowl, Isabel experi-
ences the moment when the object of desire reveals itself as 
646 Isabel Archer’s “Delicious Pain”
emptiness, as lack. This moment, in James, as in classical lit-
erature, is reserved for the very brave, for the individual who 
is willing to confront the limit, the impossibility, of her desire. 
To understand the real nature of the self—something Isabel 
can encounter only by entering what Lacan calls “the space 
between two deaths”—she must, in a sense, die (1986/1992, 
p. 248). The narcissistic fantasy and its persistent failure are 
both essential components of desire. With willful consistency, 
Isabel pursues her fate, seeking that moment in experience that 
will reveal “the presence of death” (Lacan, 1981, p. 257), the 
death of the very subject she is composing: her “self.” James’s 
insistence on the composer’s failure to secure the knowledge 
or wholeness she seeks reveals the deep connection between 
the danger of an idealizing aestheticism and Lacan’s argument 
that such misrecognitions, however necessary, ultimately reveal 
the permanent incompletion of the self. 
Midway through the novel, Isabel reflects on the “wondrous 
vision” she initially had of Gilbert Osmond: a vision “fed through 
charmed senses and oh such a stirred fancy!” (p. 357). Lacan 
asks, “How can the dream, the bearer of the subject’s desire 
produce that which makes the trauma emerge?” (1981, p. 55). 
This is the paradoxical question that Isabel explores in her 
midnight vigil. James shows us his heroine “motionlessly see-
ing,” reviewing her journey and her decisions, from her initial 
infatuation with Osmond to the world that now encloses her in 
“a dark narrow alley with a dead wall at the end” (p. 356). When 
James’s heroine reflects that Osmond has “deliberately, almost 
malignantly . . . put the lights out one by one,” she understands 
that he has withdrawn his appreciation of her ego ideal: “She 
knew of no wrong he had done . . . she simply believed he 
hated her” (p. 356). But Isabel also sees that Osmond’s hatred 
is a result of her rejection of the way he wants to be seen: “It 
was her scorn of his assumptions, it was this that made him 
draw himself up . . . that she should turn the hot light of her 
disdain upon his own conception of things—this was a danger 
he had not allowed for” (p. 362). The “fatal attachment” which 
linked Isabel to Osmond and Osmond to Isabel, constructed 
around a mutual commitment to their respective self-images 
(which each saw mirrored in the gaze of the other), has been 
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undone: “they looked at each other with eyes that were on 
either side a declaration of the deception suffered” (p. 356). 
When it is clear that Osmond no longer mirrors back to her 
the ideal Isabel has been fashioning, for herself but also to 
please her suitor, her image of him also collapses. Isabel thus 
discovers that her chosen object, that impossible object of desire, 
is “the object which cannot be swallowed . . . It remains stuck 
in the gullet of the signifier” (Žižek, 1999, p. 270). “Nothing 
was a pleasure to her now . . . There was an everlasting weight 
on her heart—there was a livid light on everything” (p. 363). 
Like John Marcher’s “beast” in The Beast in the Jungle, perhaps 
the most powerful representation of impossible desire in all of 
James, Osmond’s rejection will force Isabel to experience the 
“splitting” that engenders the paradoxical birth of her (shat-
tered) subjectivity.
To many readers, Isabel’s painful struggle to understand 
Osmond’s disaffection offers a poignant moment of recogni-
tion: James’s heroine seems to move from blindness to insight, 
holding up to the light her original impressions of her husband 
and comparing them to her new—and darker—knowledge. If 
she has chosen her fate, according to such readings, she has 
done so honorably, the way a tragic protagonist is blinded by 
her own best qualities—her naïve, hopeful trust in another and 
her overconfidence in her judgment. But Isabel takes unusual 
responsibility for her role in defining Osmond, acknowledging 
that her suitor “was not changed; he had not disguised him-
self” (p. 357). She concedes that she has been aware of “the 
realms of restriction and depression” that constitute Osmond’s 
nature from the beginning (p. 356). Given her early insights 
about her suitor, and her consistent preference for the space 
of melancholy, of darkness, one wonders about the perverse 
pleasure this scene finally offers James’s heroine. In a sense, 
it is the moment she has been waiting for. As her narrator 
explains, “Suffering, with Isabel, was an active condition; it 
was not a chill, a stupor, a despair; it was a passion of thought, 
of speculation, of response to every pressure” (p. 356). The 
“exquisite instrument” that is Osmond’s mind is well known to 
her, and the “house of darkness, the house of dumbness, the 
house of suffocation” is one that she has chosen (pp. 359–360).
648 Isabel Archer’s “Delicious Pain”
Just before Isabel’s painful examination of Osmond’s char-
acter during her reflective vigil, a scene that adumbrates her 
own painful suppression of her identity as she has worked to 
please her husband, James offers his readers a visual representa-
tion of Isabel, her official “portrait” as Osmond’s wife, one that 
articulates the death-in-life quality that seems to permeate her 
new identity. Ralph’s response to the portrait Osmond seems to 
have succeeded in creating is a painful echo of his own initial 
tendency to frame his cousin when she first arrives at Garden-
court: “Suddenly, I receive a Titian, by the post, to hang on my 
wall . . .” (p. 63). Missing the ironic echo of his own impulses, 
including his decision to endow his cousin with money so that 
he can witness what she will make of her life, Ralph is horrified 
at the way Isabel has become someone else’s representation: 
she wears a mask that “completely cover[s] her face. There [is] 
something fixed and mechanical in the serenity painted on it; 
this [is] not an expression . . . it [is] a representation” (p. 330). 
Ralph registers the way Isabel’s noble ideals have been both 
realized and ironized: “Slender still, but lovelier than before, 
she had gained no great maturity of aspect; yet there was an 
amplitude and a brilliancy in her personal arrangements that 
gave a touch of insolence to her beauty . . . The free, keen 
girl had become quite another person; what he saw was the 
fine lady who was supposed to represent something” (p. 331).
To Ralph, and to some critics, James’s heroine has simply 
been “appropriated by Osmond’s mind,” but, in fact, this por-
trait is consonant with Isabel’s own aesthetic ideals (Kasten, 
1984, p. 61). The “amplitude,” “brilliancy,” even, to a degree, the 
“insolence” (p. 331) of Isabel’s character are already suggested 
in her earliest fantasies about herself, her desire to be a con-
trolled, aesthetically complete, representation. Long before the 
appearance of Osmond she muses: “one should be one of the 
best, should be conscious of a fine organisation” (pp. 53–54). 
Isabel has become a portrait that not only Osmond but she 
herself, and even Ralph, have helped to compose: she is “better 
worth looking at than most works of art” (p. 50), as her cousin 
describes her at the outset. But she is also “the fine lady who 
. . . will always wear a mask” (p. 330). On one level, this portrait 
is the logical culmination of Isabel’s quest, her induction into 
Osmond’s world, her placement within the aesthetic frame she 
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has chosen. Yet, as Jonathan Freedman has suggested, Isabel is 
not wholly contained by the “insidious” “process of aestheticiza-
tion” that grips Osmond; a “resonant ambiguity” remains that 
grants her an “interpretative mystery” (1994, p. 68).
Ralph’s silent confrontation with Isabel’s mature self-
portrait, and the “resonant ambiguity” of James’s heroine, 
despite her seeming entrapment by Osmond, invites us to con-
sider the complex meaning of portraiture in this novel. How 
might James’s ideas about portraiture and, more broadly, his 
extensive and varied use of art in his works, be connected to 
our discussion of loss, emptiness and pleasurable pain, that is, 
to Lacanian jouissance? To explore these questions, we need to 
take a step back from The Portrait of a Lady and examine earlier 
and later texts in which a work of art functions as an ambigu-
ous object of desire, one that, with uncanny consistency, leads 
the Jamesian protagonist through a range of emotions, from 
self-blinding seduction to an embrace of the death drive, and 
an acceptance of mortality, of the shattered subject.
iii
In an essay entitled “Venice,” originally written in 1882 
and later anthologized in Italian Hours, James is struck by a 
painting of Tintoretto’s entitled “Pallas Chasing Away Mars”: 
“a young woman of noble appearance is administering a gentle 
push to a fine young man in armour, as if to tell him to keep 
his distance.” He describes “the gentleness of this push . . . the 
charming way in which she puts out her arm . . . and rests her 
young hand, its rosy fingers parted, on his dark breastplate” 
(James, 1988, p. 30). Pallas Athene’s stance echoes that of 
Isabel Archer, whose deep intelligence and independence are 
in conflict with her desire. In Tintoretto’s painting, as James 
reads it, Athene’s gesture epitomizes desire in its moment of 
suspended ambivalence: her push is “gentle”; her “rosy fingers” 
touch Mars’s breast. Tintoretto’s Athene mirrors Isabel’s con-
fused emotions towards her suitors.
James’s heroine’s affinity for sad places is similarly antici-
pated in his early travel literature. In 1873, in an essay entitled 
“Roman Rides,” also later anthologized in Italian Hours, James 
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writes of the Roman Campagna in a way that foreshadows Isa-
bel’s sad visit there towards the end of her journey. He takes 
deep delight in the “typical ‘Italian landscape’ of old-fashioned 
art. It was so bright and yet so sad, so still and yet so charged 
. . . with the murmur of an extinguished life” (1988, p. 106). A 
few pages later, in the same essay, James “confess[es]” that the 
pleasure he takes in the somber sadness of the scene “shows 
a note of perversity” (p. 114). Frequently in his travel writing, 
James relishes the discovery of landscapes that “dispose them-
selves into pictures” (p. 115), not merely for their beauty but 
because they are filled with a history of what has been lost, 
ruins that contain a dark core, a melancholy story.
Already in James’s early fiction, works of art, from sculp-
tures to portraits, silently reveal the poignant truth of impos-
sible desire, its connection to mortality. In several early tales, 
where a work of art, literally or figuratively, plays a major role, 
there is already a dangerous flirtation with death, even death 
in life. In “The Madonna of the Future” and “The Last of the 
Valerii,” an imagined painting and a literal sculpture lure the 
main character into a state that anticipates madness, even death. 
The work of art chosen by the character is negated: ridiculed, 
or, literally, buried. The artist in “The Madonna of the Future” 
chooses death over a life that has destroyed his illusion of the 
Madonna (James, 1873/1962c). The young Italian nobleman 
in “The Last of the Valerii” is eager to sacrifice his marriage, 
and possibly his life, in his worship of the statue of Venus 
(James, 1874/1962a). Although he relinquishes his desire at 
the command of his wife who insists that the statue be buried, 
he retains a hand of the sculpture, which remains (hidden) in 
plain sight, in his private cabinet.
Euphemia de Mauves in “Madame de Mauves,” an 1874 tale 
that probes the deferred desire that will shape the plot of The 
Ambassadors, has a pure but frozen rigidity that is a source of 
admiration for her innocent suitor Longmore, who, like Isabel 
in her idealization of Osmond, sees in Euphemia’s coldness 
“an extraordinary charm” (1874/1962b, p. 145). Her unat-
tainability evokes in Longmore “a kind of aching impotence” 
(p. 173) that anticipates Isabel’s pleasurable pain in her early 
encounters with Osmond.
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From early stories to the novels of the major phase, we 
see that James situates the art object, real or imagined, at the 
crux of desire and loss, a loss that reflects Lacanian “lack,” 
exposing not only his characters’ illusions but also their shat-
tered subjectivity. Like Isabel, James’s late protagonists discover 
that the aesthetic dimension brings with it tragic knowledge, 
knowledge of their permanent incompletion, their mortality. 
As they attempt to capture and still the lives around them, they 
are trapped by their own designs, recognizing, finally, that the 
aesthetic frame grants permanence only in death. Milly Theale, 
in The Wings of the Dove, initially apprehends her mortality as 
she gazes at the Bronzino Lord Mark takes her to see. She un-
derstands why the portrait reminds him of her: it is the face of 
the young woman, “almost livid in hue” and “unaccompanied 
by a joy.” Most important, she is “dead, dead, dead” (James, 
1978, p. 137). Early in the novel, Milly has already discovered 
“the great common anxiety,” the “grim breathing space” that 
surrounds her like a gentle coffin (p. 153). But when Sir Luke 
Strett, “the great doctor,” indicates that she will soon die, Milly 
discovers that her new knowledge is “like an absolute possession, 
a new resource altogether”; her destiny “something [already] 
done up in the softest silk and tucked away under the arm of 
memory” (p. 143). Milly acknowledges her death in life more 
explicitly than Isabel, recognizing the power of her portrait 
to grant permanence but only in the memory of those who 
remain: “I shall never be better than this,” she tells Lord Mark, 
as they gaze together at the Bronzino (p. 137). After her death, 
Milly Theale becomes Densher’s “maimed child,” his “priceless 
pearl” (p. 398), living forever within the frame of the portrait, 
the beautiful Bronzino she encounters in Book I, as she takes 
her place in Densher’s memory.
Perhaps James’s most complex example of the way por-
traits conceal, only to betray, the absence of life, the void at 
the center of identity, is explored in The Golden Bowl. In the 
opening chapters, Maggie Verver purposefully inducts Prince 
Amerigo into her gallery, imagining the perfection he will bring 
to her life and marriage as a morçeau de musée (James, 1985, p. 
43), only to discover an imaginary “pagoda” in her garden that 
denies her entrance. The pagoda represents the hidden desire 
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of Charlotte and Amerigo, a Lacanian “stain” that defies Mag-
gie’s ambitious efforts to control the design of her marriage. 
It is only by consigning Charlotte and Amerigo to the status of 
“a pair of effigies . . . on one of the platforms of Madame Tus-
saud” at the end of the novel that Maggie reclaims her status as 
composer, but the work of art she has designed is devoid of life 
(p. 574). Ironically, however, Amerigo, who seems to embody 
the idea of the living dead, finally existing only within Mag-
gie’s collection, signals in the subtlety of his gaze the Lacanian 
Thing (Das Ding) that escapes his wife’s design—it is his gaze 
that dominates the ending, hers that buries itself in his breast 
“in pity and dread” (p. 580). At the end of both The Golden Bowl 
and The Wings of the Dove, James’s protagonists are situated both 
within and outside the frame they have composed, in the space 
Lacan would call “between two deaths” (Lacan, 1986/1992, p. 
270). Precisely because they are “outside or beyond all hope” 
(p. 270), they can interrogate their own designs.
Isabel Archer, too, while seeming to remain within her por-
trait, in the end transcends the representation she has helped 
to compose. We know, especially after her midnight vigil, that 
her portrait contains a remainder, something that escapes the 
frame. The question of that remainder haunts the final chapters 
of the novel. A piece of the Lacanian Real—metonymy for the 
original, albeit unknowable, Isabel before her induction into 
Osmond’s symbolic world—continues to haunt the reader.15
iv
As James’s novel comes to a close, late portraits—of Os-
mond, of Isabel, of Merle—expose the profound emptiness at 
the heart of everyone’s design, whether innocent or strategic, 
and the powerful truth that this emptiness reveals: the failure of 
representation, of the coherence of the subject. Following the 
portrait of Isabel as observed by Ralph and the revised portrait 
of Osmond reviewed by Isabel during her midnight vigil, James 
offers us a final, explosive portrait of Serena Merle, one that 
enables Isabel to confront her mentor’s betrayal and witness 
the disintegration of the mask. Just after the Countess Gemini 
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has told her of Merle’s duplicity and of her role in Isabel’s 
marriage, she meets Merle unexpectedly at Pansy’s convent: 
“Madame Merle was already so present to her vision that her 
appearance in the flesh was like suddenly, and rather awfully, 
seeing a painted picture move” (p. 456). In this moment, Isabel 
recognizes Merle’s awareness that the truth of her relationship 
to Osmond and Pansy is out: Isabel observes a “sudden break 
in [Merle’s] voice, a lapse in her continuity, which was in itself 
a complete drama . . . Isabel saw it all as distinctly as if it had 
been reflected in a large clear glass . . . Madame Merle had 
lost her pluck and saw before her the phantom of exposure” 
(p. 458). We see, through Isabel’s eyes, the shattered “self” of 
Serena Merle, a dark counterpoint to Isabel’s own failure to 
create a coherent aesthetic self.
We have traced Isabel’s induction into the frame of the 
picture, her consistent pattern of choosing negatively, her at-
traction to the “extraordinary charm” of late afternoon with its 
“masses of purple shadow” (p. 226), her explicit preference for 
dark spaces, for mystery, for “slightly treacherous” landscapes 
(p. 265), for the “beautiful blank faces” of Greek sculptures and 
their “noble quietude” (p. 257), her attraction to a life whose 
“lowness of tone” (p. 237) anticipates the negation of her early 
spirited impulses. In the final chapters of the novel Isabel enters 
another frame, one where she immerses herself in her pain. Just 
before her trip to England to see her dying cousin, Isabel takes 
a drive into the Roman countryside and contemplates “the ruin 
of her happiness” (p. 430). The landscape before her offers her 
a “companionship in endurance,” a space where she can “drop 
her secret sadness into the silence of lonely places” (p. 431). 
What she sees perfectly mirrors James’s own discovery of the 
melancholy Roman landscape in his early travel writing. She 
gazes “through the veil of her personal sadness at the splendid 
sadness of the scene,” feeling a kinship with the “motionless 
shepherds in lonely attitudes” (p. 431). The landscape before 
her is a fully realized, ironic reprise of Isabel’s early idealistic 
projection of life with Osmond, an image suffused, we recall, 
with the twilight “of an old sorrow that sometimes ached today” 
(p. 237). Her nostalgic immersion in this moment is an act of 
mourning for the loss of her idealized images—of those she 
654 Isabel Archer’s “Delicious Pain”
has loved and of her own ideal self. Yet her feeling of “kinship” 
with this scene and her recognition that the sadness is somehow 
“splendid” testifies poignantly to the painful pleasure her new 
condition has wrought. The selfhood Isabel now seeks is neither 
the freedom of spirit she avows nor the self-destruction that 
seems imminent at the novel’s close. Rather, she chooses the 
“delightful sadness,” described by Denis de Rougemont, a life 
in which “suffering and understanding are deeply connected; 
death and self-awareness are in league” (1983, p. 51).
Following this sorrowful, contemplative moment in which 
Isabel seems to accept her fate, she makes her way to London 
to be with her dying cousin, Ralph. The journey, which she 
undertakes (like Oedipus) “with sightless eyes” (p. 465), is a 
subtle symbolic enactment of her own death: “to cease utterly,” 
she muses, “to give it all up and not know anything more—this 
idea was as sweet as the vision of a cool bath in a marble tank” 
(p. 465). In her final meeting with her cousin on his deathbed, 
Isabel strips herself of her mask and reveals her pain to him: 
it is the only genuine, and explicit, moment of intimacy in 
the novel. With Ralph dying in her arms, Isabel murmurs, “In 
such hours as this, what have we to do with pain? That’s not 
the deepest thing; there’s something deeper” (p. 478). This 
“deeper” feeling is, in part, the love Isabel finally confesses to 
her cousin, a very different kind of love from the painful plea-
sure we have been examining, something closer to karitas than 
eros, yet she is already connecting the death of Ralph to her 
own forthcoming imprisonment and dissolution. During her 
journey to see him, she recalls the silent marble statues she had 
identified with in the Roman gallery before her commitment 
to Osmond. Anticipating her own entombment, she imagines 
herself to be like one of “those Etruscan figures couched upon 
the receptacle of their ashes” (p. 465). At the height of her 
multiplied recognitions of betrayal and loss, Isabel confronts 
the painful knowledge of her failed experiment as an artist, as 
a composer of her own destiny.
Her touching final moment with Ralph before his death 
is followed by a contrasting scene of forced intimacy with her 
first suitor, Caspar Goodwood, who comes to Gardencourt to 
offer her an escape from Osmond and the prison she is about 
to re-enter. The scene between them is psychologically complex 
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and fraught with contradiction. Isabel admits she is drawn to 
him: “she had wanted help and here was help; it had come in 
a rushing torrent.” But with her next thought, she recognizes 
her deeper connection to the death drive: “to let him take 
her into his arms would be the next best thing to her dying” 
(p. 489). Goodwood, like Osmond, threatens to erase her 
being, precisely through his overpowering love. Anticipating 
his embrace, she recognizes “that she had never been loved 
before” and “this belief, for a moment was a kind of rapture 
in which she felt herself sink and sink” (pp. 488–489). Their 
encounter is captured in a single sentence in the 1881 edition 
of The Portrait: “His kiss was like a flash of lightning; when it 
was dark again, she was free” (James, 1881/1997, p. 634). In 
the 1908 edition, Isabel’s response is extraordinarily visceral, 
emphasizing the physical and psychic pain Goodwood inflicts. 
She experiences his embrace as a gothic nightmare. When he 
seizes her, she feels “each thing in his hard manhood that had 
least pleased her, each aggressive fact of his face, his figure, his 
presence” (p. 489). His desire is “something potent, acrid and 
strange”; it “force[s] open her set teeth” (p. 488). The violation 
is not only sexual; it is ontological. Goodwood seems, literally, 
to break open, dissolve, the boundaries of Isabel’s self: “The 
world had never seemed so large; it seemed to open out, all 
round her, to take the form of a mighty sea, where she floated 
in fathomless waters” (p. 489).
What are we to make of James’s heroine’s refusal of 
Goodwood and the contradictory emotions that she feels? 
Her rejection of him cannot be reduced, as he suggests, to 
a conflict between her desire and what “people will say, for 
the bottomless idiocy of the world” (p. 488). Isabel’s blunt 
American suitor’s arguments are somehow beside the point; 
she barely hears them. The truth is, he does not represent, 
has never represented, Isabel’s desire, and his embrace is a 
willful and one-sided “act of possession” she cannot bear. His 
final attempt to seize Isabel has the opposite effect: “She had 
not known where to turn; but she knew now. There was a 
very straight path” (p. 490). Goodwood does not offer a freer 
choice, but rather a more literal kind of possession, absent, to 
be sure, Osmond’s passive aggressive manipulation. But why 
does Isabel, in the end, choose the negation that is Osmond?16
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Michael Gorra, in his profoundly thoughtful Portrait of a 
Novel, offers a context for Isabel’s decision, arguing that her 
choice both echoes and anticipates an insight characteristic 
of the American novel from Hawthorne to Fitzgerald—that of 
innocence lost and accepted, the recognition “that America 
itself has had no separate or special creation . . . no exemption 
from history itself” (2012, p. 278). Thus when Goodwood tells 
Isabel, “‘the world’s all before us—and the world’s very big’” 
(p. 489), his words, according to Gorra, “are themselves an echo 
. . . [They] summon up the ending of Paradise Lost, when after 
tasting the apple and being thrust from the garden, Adam and 
Eve must step forth into the fallen world before them. This 
is the world in which Isabel knows she must live: a world of 
constraint and necessity, in which her possibilities are limited 
by her past” (Gorra, 2012, p. 326). If we grant Gorra’s claim 
that Isabel’s decision suggests a recognition of “constraint” and 
“necessity,” we should also observe that such a recognition is 
characteristic of the tragic heroine’s fatal encounter with her 
destiny, pointing, once again, to the Lacanian path we have 
been tracing here, the path of jouissance. In fact, Lacan’s own 
analysis of Antigone’s character perfectly describes the trajec-
tory of Isabel Archer: “She pushes to the limit the realization of 
something that might be called the pure and simple desire of 
death as such. She incarnates that desire” (1986/1992, p. 282).
But something equally important and specific to Isabel’s 
character occurs in the climactic confrontation with Good-
wood. She cannot accept his offer of an escape because such 
a resolution is completely inconsistent with everything she has 
struggled to understand and to become—it does not match 
her self-portrait. True, like her successors, Milly Theale in The 
Wings of the Dove and Maggie Verver in The Golden Bowl, Isabel 
is forced to acknowledge the failure of her project, her attempt 
to shape a perfect portrait of a partner, a relationship, and an 
aesthetically satisfying, though conventional, humanist self. Her 
position at the end of the novel is more consistent with her 
fellow prisoners than is usually granted. Anticipating Maggie’s 
hollow triumph when she encloses Amerigo in her portrait of 
her marriage and sends Charlotte into exile, only to find herself 
imprisoned in the rigid aesthetic structure she has designed, 
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Isabel’s stance also foreshadows Milly Theale’s transcendent 
but equally hollow triumph in death as the memory of her 
love imprints itself on Densher’s consciousness through her 
unread letter. But also like Maggie and Millie, Isabel actively 
confronts her fears—of life, of suffering, of death in life. Her 
final choices reveal her acceptance of jouissance, of mortality.
As she frees herself from Goodwood’s embrace, she once 
again anticipates her own death, thinking of “those wrecked 
and under water following a train of images before they sink” 
(p. 489). When she finds herself immersed in the “mighty sea” 
that now surrounds her (p. 489), Isabel experiences what Ellie 
Ragland, following Lacan, calls “the hole constituted in the 
compact space we call being” (1996, p. 193). Glimpsing the 
anamorphic blot that undermines all desire, she chooses her 
“very straight path” back to Rome, and to Osmond (p. 490).
Yet if the heroine of The Portrait seems more wholly alone 
than her successors, without a hint of residual or redemptive 
love on the part of Osmond (in contrast to the more complex 
emotional renderings of Densher and Amerigo), James does 
not leave us with a sense of a diminished, resigned, or despair-
ing Isabel. In rejecting Goodwood and returning to Osmond, 
we may say that Isabel “persists in unsatisfaction” and, in doing 
so, she preserves an “authentic,” “empty” “place of enjoyment” 
(Zupančič, 2000, p. 240)—the space of jouissance.17 It may seem 
not only perverse but cruel to impose such a reading on a 
character whose apparent failure of insight seems meant to 
invoke more “tender” and “expectant” emotions that James’s 
narrator suggests we adopt early in the novel (p. 54), for as de 
Rougemont wryly asks, “Who would dare to admit that . . . what 
[one] longs for with all one’s being is the annihilation of . . . 
being?” (1983, p. 49). Nonetheless, Isabel returns to Osmond, 
as Sigi Jottkand suggests, for “her own destiny in death, her 
essential negativity” (2005, p. 28). Why? Because her encoun-
ter with the limit of desire is the necessary step for “access” to 
“realization” of herself—that is, realization of her permanent 
in-coherence (Lacan, 1986/1992, p. 300). In other words, this 
is precisely the moment that the subject comes into being, in 
this encounter with its fragmentation: “Life can only be ap-
proached, can only be lived or thought about, from the place 
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of that limit where [it] is already lost, where [one] is already 
on the other side” (Lacan, 1986/1992, p. 280).
Throughout James’s major novels and tales, objects of 
“art,” idealized progeny of his characters, are undermined at 
the height of their powers; in their place is a gap, an opening, 
an abyss that is the real subject of his fiction. In the depths 
of that abyss, we see the structure of desire, its relation to 
the quest for an ideal, complete, autonomous self. In James, 
this ideal is consistently betrayed, exposing the truth of each 
protagonist’s shattered and permanently incomplete self. 
Despite The Portrait’s painful conclusion, suggesting Isabel’s 
literal imprisonment, James’s heroine is, paradoxically, liber-
ated. When Isabel flees Goodwood she is neither diminished 
nor resigned, and the ending of the novel, far from being its 
least satisfactory aspect, is from a post-humanist perspective 
its most satisfying. Her decision to return to Osmond illumi-
nates her Sophoclean “splendour,”18 her radical refusal of the 
conventional humanist position longed for by some of James’s 
contemporary readers, which would return her to a world where 
Goodwood or Warburton would truly grind her “in the very 
mill of the conventional” (p. 478), demanding that she live the 
illusion of a coherent self, in a safe but empty shell. Return-
ing to Osmond, Isabel defines herself against the wholeness 
and autonomy she has consciously sought—in a space where 
she will experience her in-coherence. As Žižek explains, “Far 
from standing for the simple opposite of life—that is, for a 
tendency towards self-obliteration—the fundamental paradox 
of the psychoanalytic notion of the death drive [of jouissance] 
is that it is the Freudian name for immortality” (1999, p. 261). 
Like Antigone, even though she is entombed and believed 
dead, Isabel lives splendidly in pleasurable pain, a shattered, 
yet (self) valorized, subject.
notes
1. All references to the text are from the Norton Critical Edition (2nd ed.), unless 
otherwise noted. The Norton Critical Edition is based on the 1908 New York 
Edition.
2. Miller explores a variety of possibilities for Isabel’s decision but concludes that “the 
novel does not tell the reader enough to confirm a reading. It leaves the reader 
unable to understand Isabel’s decisions and therefore unable, if the reader does 
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not import something from outside the text, to pass judgment on her decision 
as good or bad” (2005, p. 743). 
3. Despite James’s partial concession to his contemporary critics, it is worth noting 
that in his substantial revision of the original 1881 edition in 1908, he deliberately 
removed any ambiguity about Isabel’s decision to return to Osmond, and, in this 
sense, he has not left his heroine en l’air. See Bazzanella (1969) for a thorough 
discussion of James’s revision of the novel’s ending.
4. “Who is there who in the name of pleasure doesn’t start to weaken when the first 
half-serious step is taken toward jouissance?” (Lacan, 1992, p. 185). Referencing 
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Lacan observes, “This is where the function 
of the lost object originates in Freudian discourse . . . it is explicitly around 
masochism . . . conceived only in the dimension of the search for this ruinous 
jouissance, that Freud’s entire text revolves” (Lacan, 2007, p. 46).
5. According to Ellie Ragland, the quest for the object of desire always involves, on 
some tacit level, an awareness of the impossibility of an original coherence (and 
connection to the mother): “The loss of this imagined continuity . . . places loss 
squarely at the center of all language and all human relations” (1996, p. 195).
6. “Freud . . . wrote Das Ich und das Es in order to maintain this fundamental dis-
tinction between the true subject of the unconscious and the ego” (Lacan, 1977, 
p. 128). Dylan Evans clarifies: “The subject can never be anything other than 
divided, split, alienated from himself” (1996, p. 192); for Freud and for Lacan, 
this “split” identifies the distinction between the conscious and unconscious: “the 
split denotes the impossibility of the ideal of a fully present self-consciousness; 
the subject will never know himself completely” (Evans, 1996, p. 192).
7. For Lacan, it is “lack” which causes desire to arise. The first object of lack is one’s 
own loss, “the phantasy of one’s death, of one’s disappearance” (Lacan, 1981, 
p. 214). But lack continues to create “the link between the desire of the subject 
and the desire of the Other” (p. 215).
8. Interestingly, William James, anticipating Lacan’s formulation, provides a straight-
forward account of this notion of love as defined by the other: “The most peculiar 
social self which one is apt to have is in the mind of the person one is in love 
with . . . To his own consciousness he is not, so long as this particular social self 
fails to get recognition, and when it is recognized his contentment passes all 
bounds” (James, 1890, p. 294).
9. The objet petit a is “the cause of desire” and the “object around which the drive 
turns” (Lacan, 1981, p. 243); it is “at the level of the desire of the Other that 
the subject’s desire is constituted” (p. 235). Referencing Freud’s chapter on 
“Hypnosis and the State of Being in Love,” Lacan also connects the a to the ego 
ideal: Freud “designates what he calls the object—in which you must recognize 
what I call the a—the ego and the ego ideal” (p. 272).
10. In developing the notion of jouissance, Lacan is drawing on Freud’s classic formula-
tion regarding the structure of love: “Some obstacle is necessary to swell the tide 
of the libido to its heights; and in all periods of history, wherever natural barriers 
in the way of satisfaction have not sufficed, mankind has erected conventional 
ones in order to be able to enjoy love” (1912, p. 187).
11. Veeder notes that Isabel’s “lifelong dilemma” (perhaps like that of James him-
self) is “how to love, and yet maintain enough distance to escape the exposure 
inevitable with intimacy; how to remain in life, but not of it” (1990, p. 118). 
12. “Lacan defines the objet petit a as ‘a symbol of the lack’ (Lacan, 1981, p. 103). He 
associates the objet petit a with the term agalma (a Greek term meaning a glory, an 
ornament, an offering to the gods, or a little statue of a god) which he extracts 
from Plato’s Symposium. Just as the agalma is a precious object hidden inside a 
relatively worthless box, so the objet petit a is the object of desire which we seek 
in the other” (Evans, 1996, p. 125). 
13. As Lacan explains, “This entropy, this point of loss, is the sole point, the sole 
regular point at which we have access to the nature of jouissance” (2007, pp. 50-
51).
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14. “The Thing,” or Das Ding, for Lacan, is, in relation to jouissance, the lost object 
which we constantly seek, “the object of incestuous desire, the mother” (Evans, 
1996, p. 205). The subject circles around it without ever attaining it, yet it remains 
the cause of desire. From 1963 on, Lacan replaces this term with objet petit a as 
the symbol of our unattainable desire (p. 205).
15. The “real,” for Lacan, is that which is outside language, that which “resists sym-
bolization absolutely” (1988, p. 66). It is fundamentally related to the pleasure 
principle (and stands in opposition to the reality principle) because it makes us 
aware of its existence through trauma, through its inaccessibility: “it is essentially 
the missed encounter” (Lacan, 1981, p. 55).
16. Osmond tells Isabel, “I think we should accept the consequences of our actions, 
and what I value most in life is the honour of a thing!” (p. 446). As the primary 
condition of an ethical stance, Lacan asks the question, “Have you acted in 
conformity with the desire that is in you?” (1986/1992, p. 314). Osmond’s final 
insistence on Isabel’s fidelity to her act (of marrying him) supports a Lacanian 
reading of his function: he has pushed Isabel to a consistency which is logical and 
even (perversely) ethical: he demands that she be true to her choice—regardless 
of its content. However painful it may seem, Isabel remains true to her original 
desire.
17. James’s heroine’s “fidelity” to this “lost enjoyment,” to apply Alenka Zupančič’s 
reading of Lacan, reveals a “‘heroism of the lack’. . .an attitude through which 
the individual “persists” in “unsatisfaction” and “desire preserves the authentic 
place of enjoyment, even if it remains empty” (2000, p. 240).
18. See Lacan’s analysis of Antigone, as an illustration of the death instinct: “Antigone 
reveals to us the line of sight that defines desire. . . . It is Antigone herself who 
fascinates us, Antigone in her unbearable splendor . . . This terrible, self-willed 
victim disturbs us” (1986/1992, p. 281). “She pushes to the limit the realization 
of something that might be called the pure and simple desire of death as such. 
She incarnates that desire” (p. 282).
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